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motivational influence of ethical [i.e. altruistic] considerations on fortuitous or
escapable inclinations. Their hold on us must be deep..."2' Ultimately, however,
he too failed to solve the problem. In one of his later publications, moreover, he
arrived at the conclusion (as we have already seen) that the motivational force of
moral considerations which go beyond self-interest is not sufficiently strong.
Moral conversion is indeed necessary. Notice here that this particular metaphor
is borrowed from the vocabulary of Christians, whose repertoire of concepts has
much more to offer than retrospective, evolutionary sociobiology and the other
sciences (including the social sciences) when it comes to alternative perspectives
on the human species. There is a God who does not keep himself aloof from
humankind. On the contrary, he offers them his love. People can turn away from
their wickedness and live: if and when they submit to the love of God. Human
motivations can change when they fall under the influence of Divine Grace: for
then "costly" moral obligations are not only recognized, but can also be
discharged by ordinary human beings. So it could be true both that the "costly"
moral obligations of the objectivist blend better with a theistic than with a
naturalistic world view; and that theism, unlike naturalism, can give a coherent
account of the possibility that such moral demands will be honoured in practice.
Obviously, the fundamental assumption in this argument is that (Christian)
theism is actually true, or at least the very essence of theistic belief, viz. that a
personal God does exist. Agnostics do not necessarily have to deny the
reasonableness of this belief. In that case, the fact that a Christian ethics which
is firmly based upon theistic principles is superior to other theories of morality
could even be, for them, an argument in favour of the existence of God.
21. Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford 1970, p.6.
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Natural Evil and Eschatology
Gijsbert van den Brink (Utrecht)
I
The contemporary Anglo-American philosophical debate on the problem of evil,
initiated by J.L. Mackie's seminal article on "Evil and Omnipotence,"1 seems to
have entered a new stage in recent years. Instead of concentrating upon the
logical problem of so-called moral evil, usually in connection with the Free Will
Defence as a possible solution, the present discussion seems to have become
more and more focused upon the evidential and existential problems, as well as
on natural evil, and is therefore now oriented to other possible strategies of
defence.2
1. Mind 64 (1955), p.200-212.
2. This shift can be attested by references to many recent publications. We mention
only the following. On the evidential problem: Alvin Plantinga, "The Probabilistic
Argument from Evil," Philosophical Studies 35 (1979), p.1-53; on natural evil:
Richard Swinburne, "Knowledge from Experience, and the Problem of Evil," in:
W.J. Abraham & S.W. Holtzer (eds.), The Rationality of Religious Belief, Oxford
1987, p.141-167; on both the evidential problem and natural evil: David McKenrie,
"A Kantian Theodicy," Faith and Philosophy Î (1984), p.236-247; on the existential
problem of evil: K. Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, Oxford 1986; MM.
Adams, "Problems of Evil: More Advice to Christian Philosophers," Faith and
Philosophy 5 (1988), p.121-143; G. van den Brink, "Theodicee en triniteit,"
Theologia Reformata 33 (1990), p.7-27.
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In this contribution, I want to take up the question of natural evil. More
specifically, I want to discuss one particular type of defence against the charge
that God cannot exist, since if He existed He would not have allowed the
presence of so much natural evil in our world. Because the type of defence3 in
question has become increasingly popular in current literature, and since the
objection I intend to raise against it here is to my knowledge peculiarly absent
in that literature, this strict limitation does not imply an irrelevance.
My procedure will be as follows. First, taking as a starting point a recent
article of Prof. Brummer on the problem of theodicy, I offer a brief sketch of the
theisdc explanation of natural evil which is at stake, and which is articulated by
Prof. Briimmer in a very eloquent fashion (section Π). Second, I render some
objections against it (III), my main objection taking the form of an argument
from eschatology (IV). Third, I show that in a later article of his on theodicy,
Brummer has become sensitive to the force of this argument, but nevertheless
does not address the dilemma in which this puts him with regard to the theistic
interpretation of natural evil advocated by him in his earlier article (V). In an
attempt to show that Briimmer's views are nevertheless internally coherent, I try
myself to address this dilemma, by sketching out what seems to me the most
promising way of reconciling Briimmer's theodicy with an adequate account of
eschatology (VI). Unfortunately, however, I see myself forced to acknowledge
that this attempt fails. Fourth, then, I draw some conclusions (VII).
II
In Michael Peterson's useful survey of recent work on the problem of evil, the
rare present-day explanations for natural evil are subsumed under the term
"natural law theodicy," since in all of them the concept of natural law plays a
crucial role.4 The core of this form of theodicy has already been described by
Both negatively in the form of a defence in a strict sense, as well as in the more
positive mode of a theodicy. See for the difference between the two concepts most
recently Michael Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief, Oxford 1991, p.100-
103. Since the distinction does not bear upon the issue discussed in the present
paper, we use both terms interchangeably. A defence as well as a theodicy may
consist of several different arguments.
M.L. Peterson, "Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical
Quarterly 20 (1983), p.329-331; cf. on their relative rarity ibid., p.331: "It is a
shame that there has not been more work on natural evil and natural law theodicy
in the period under review."
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F .R. Tennant5, but here I recapitulate the main thrust of the somewhat extended
version presented by Prof. Brummer in 1982.6 Brummer unfolds his argument
in the context of a discussion of what he calls "passive evil," i.e. ali kinds of evil
that people and animals have to endure (as opposed to the "active evils" that they
bring about themselves, and which can be accounted for in terms of ihe free-will
defence). But the category of passive evil is essentially related to that of natural
evil, since even the passive evil which people inflict upon one another, although
it can of course not be identified with natural evil, is ultimately dependent upon
the character of the natural order. It is the structure of our natural order which
makes it possible that passive evils are experienced.
Why didn't an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God create the natural order
in such a way, that it didn't cause or permit so much passive evil? Why did He
refrain from creating a world, in which the experience of passive evil would have
been impossible? Intuitively, most of us would be prepared to consider such a
world to be a better world than the actual one. Brummer, however, addresses
these questions by pointing out that it is highly difficult to imagine in what sense
a world without (the possibility of) passive evil would really be better than the
actual world. To support this claim, he first gives the examples of pain and
sorrow. In the life of human beings and animals both these feelings function as
a kind of necessary psychical mechanism. Pain warns them that something is
wrong with their body, whereas sorrow enables them to relieve themselves of
certain sad experiences. Moreover, it is one and the same psychical structure
which makes possible the experience of both pleasure and pain; and if we lacked
the capacity to feei sorrow, it would be equally impossible for us to experience
joy. Therefore, it is not so clear that the actual world is worse than a world in
which we were unable to experience pain or sorrow.
5. F.R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology Vol.2, Cambridge 21968, p.l97ff.
6. For the following, see V. Brummer, "Het kwaad en de goedheid van God,"
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 36 (1982), p.29-51, especially p.37-40. Prof.
Brümmer has recently indicated that by now he is no longer content with the thrust
of this article as a whole (cf. his "Kronkels in mijn denkweg," in his: Wijsgerige
theologie in beweging, Utrecht 1992). That Brümmer still adheres to the theodicy
for natural evil as outlined in this article, however, appears from the fact that he
offers essentially the same argument in his recent "Zijn theodicee-argumenten
overtuigend?," Wijsgerig Perspectief 30 (1989/1990), p.67-71. Unfortunately, neither
article has been translated into English.
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Subsequently, Briimmer gives a stronger and more sophisticated version of
this argument, by claiming that a "hedonistic paradise,"7 i.e. a world in which no
pain and sorrow are possible, is less preferable than the world we live in for at
least four reasons. Let us briefly review these reasons.
(1) A hedonistic paradise is either logically impossible, or has an
anthropocentric ecology. As Thomas Aquinas already argued, it would be
impossible for, for example, a lion to live without preying on and killing
other animals. So a hedonistic paradise for all living beings is logically
impossible. A hedonistic paradise for mankind alone, on the other hand,
implies an anthropocentric mono-culture. Whether this would be a better
world than ours, with its complex ecological balance, is highly questionable.
(2) A hedonistic paradise presupposes a world without regularity. For clearly,
the interests of individuals are varying. What is advantageous for someone
in certain circumstances, would be disadvantageous in other circumstances.
But a natural order accommodating itself to our contingent needs and wishes
is hardly imaginable. This is the point made by Tennant: "If water is to have
the various properties in virtue of which it plays its beneficial part ..., it
cannot at the same time lack its obnoxious capacity to drown us."8 For a
natural order lacking any regularity would be more like a chaos than like a
cosmos, preventing us from performing many of our normal human rational
activities. There would be "no probability to guide us: no prediction, no
prudence, no accumulation of ordered experience, no pursuit of premeditated
ends, no formation of habit, no possibility of character or of culture,"9 nor
of science, Briimmer adds. The law-abidingness of nature, including its
latent dangers, is a prerequisite for all intellectual and cultural enterprise.
(3) A hedonistic paradise would more specifically preclude all human
development and creativity. Here, Brummer joins Richard Swinburne's
assessment that a half-finished universe like ours is better than a fully
finished universe, since the latter would not allow of any growth or
improvement. We should prefer a universe like ours, "one in which many
things need improving, humanly free agents do not altogether know what is
right, and their purposes are often frustrated; but one in which agents can
7. See for this term John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, Englewood Cliffs 1963 ("1990),
p.45.
8. Tennant, Philosophical Theology Vol.2, p.201.
9. Ibid, p.l99f.
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come to know what is right and can overcome the obstacles to achieve their
purposes."10 For only in such a world are human endeavour, ideals,
flourishing and creativity possible.
(4) In a hedonistic paradise morality and responsibility are excluded. The risk
of imposing physical and psychical pain upon one another is an essential
condition of the world's being the "theatre of moral life." If my morally bad
choices would never damage other people or my environment, it would be
pointless for me to act in a morally responsible way. Quoting an example
of Swinburne: like a man training in a simulator to become a pilot, I could
make mistakes, but nobody would suffer from them.
Moreover, numerous so-called second-order goods could not exist, since we
would never have an occasion to actualize them. In this connection,
Brummer lists the virtues of courage, perseverance, unselfishness,
neighbourly love, helpfulness and sympathy. All of these spiritual goods are
conditional upon the existence of certain forms of passive evil. When all
human needs are already fulfilled, people cannot act to the benefit of each
other.
Drawing the conclusion from these four strains of thought, Brummer argues
that in a hedonistic paradise it would be impossible for us to be persons and to
live in personal relations with God and with each other. "Evil is the necessary
price we have to pay for our personhood."11 Whereas the possibility of moral
evil guarantees our freedom, the possibility of natural evil is a necessary
condition for our responsibility. Only in a world like ours it is possible for us to
live in the freedom and responsibility that are essential for a genuinely personal
life - and personal life is no doubt the richest and highest conceivable form of
life. Thus, for this reason an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God can be justified
in having created and still sustaining a natural order which allows of natural evil,
rather than a hedonistic paradise which doesn't.
10. R. Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil," in: S.C. Brown (ed,), Reason and Religion,
London 1977, p.94f.
11. Brümmer, "Het kwaad," p.40: "Het kwaad is de noodzakelijke prijs, die we moeten
betalen voor ons persoon-zijn."
ra
As we pointed out above, Briimmer's account of natural evil does not constitute
one clear-cut form of theodicy, but rather combines several different motives.
More precisely, we can distinguish between three components: a natural law
theodicy, emphasizing the inevitability of a regular natural order like ours,
including its negative side-effects (1 and 2), a human development argument (3),
and an argument from the need for knowledge in combination with an higher-
order goods argument (4).12 Following Briimmer's final summary, let us call the
totality of these considerations the personal life defence against the argument for
the non-existence of God from natural evil.
Now in my opinion, despite their initial plausibility, the different parts of
the personal life defence are vulnerable to various serious counter-arguments. Lei
us mention one or two of these arguments against each of them. As to the first
consideration, it is by no means clear why a natural order in which lions don't
eat other animals and in which people under water do not drown should be
logically impossible.13 Surely, given the present bodily constitution of lions and
human beings (as well as the chemical composition of water), such things are
physically impossible. But that is quite another thing. Presumably, our conceptual
capacities are too limited to permit justified claims about the logical possibility
of other eco-systems than the one we actually live in. Therefore, it is not a priori
clear why a hedonistic paradise, in which living beings have other physical
constitutions such that they do not destroy each other and are not susceptible to
being drowned in water etc., should be logically impossible. In other words: the
important function of regularity in the natural order is beyond doubt. But how do
we know that these regularities are necessarily as damaging as they are in the
actual world?
12. See for these latter terms R. Swinburne, "The Free Will Defence," Archivio di
Filosofia 56 (1988), p.594. The "argument from the need for knowledge" entails that
we need w know how to bring about good and evil in order to be capable of morally
responsible action.
13. Of course one could stipulate the definition of a lion in such a way, that it belongs
to the very essence of a lion to have a digestive tract of such a kind that it can only
eat other animals. In that case it would indeed be logically impossible for a lion not
to eat other animals. But an essentialism of this kind is certainly not the only live
option in definition theory. Moreover, it has been rejected convincingly by Brummer
himself in his Theology and Philosophical Inquiry, London 1981, chapter 3.
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But let us grant for the sake of argument that a hedonistic paradise for every
living being is logically impossible. Then what about the alternative sketched by
Brummer, consisting in the option of a wholly anthropocentric ecology? As il
seems to me, Briimmer's own personal life defence is hardly more satisfactory
in this respect. For the personal life defence considers all natural evils in the
world's history to be justified only for the sake of their enabling human beings
to lead a personal life. Since it is not clear in which ways we can imagine
animals {not to speak of plants) to lead personal lives, the whole of nature is
supposed to suffer for the mere pleasure of the homo sapiens, who is enabled
thereby to lead a rich personal life.
As to the second component of Briimmer's defence, the human development
argument is inadequate for at least two reasons. First, it does not demonstrate that
the presence of passive evil is a necessary precondition for the possibility of
human flourishing. A case can be made for the opposite point of view. I do not
consider the fact that my knowledge of mathematics is very limited to be a form
of passive evil. Nevertheless, I would consider it to be a clear instance of
personal development and creativity if, as a result of my mental efforts, my
knowledge of mathematics would significantly increase. Even if mathematics
would be unnecessary (since we didn't need to build bridges etc.), why shouldn't
we consider it to be a good in itself? Second, regardless of the question whether
human development is necessarily conditional upon the existence of natural evil,
the argument displays a moral insensitivity which cannot coherently be ascribed
to a good God. No doubt human creativity and development are highly valuable
goods. But it is not at all clear in what sense the personal flourishing of some
people could justify the sufferings and afflictions of innumerable groups of other
people, who happen to be unable to overcome the obstacles in their lives, but
rather perish (physically or mentally) as a result of them. If A's enjoying a
professorship is in one way or another (however remotely) parasitic upon B's
starving to death, our over-all estimation of A's opportunity for personal growth
and creativity ought to be much more unfavourable than is suggested by the
human development argument.
Similar comments could be made with regard to the third strand in
Brimmer's defence. It is not clear why God would be unable to make us aware
of our moral responsibility in other ways than through the experience of so much
natural evil. For example, why wasn't it enough that passive evil could only arise
from our morally wrong actions instead of from natural events as well? Do we
really need earthquakes and tornadoes in addition to all other existing kinds of
passive evils in order to recognize our moral responsibility?"
And as to the higher-order goods argument, obviously many experiences of
passive evil which might form an occasion for the actualization of second-order
goods, in fact occasion oniy more evil. "One cannot feel remorse without having
done wrong, but evil may give one an appetite for more ... In a man's own life
natural evils such as illness or social evils such as poverty may debase and
destroy him."15 And it seems simply false to claim that "for one person who
chooses to respond to the evil by rejecting God, there are a hundred who choose
to respond by leading better lives."16 Moreover, the argument mistakenly
interprets regrettable occasions for the exercise of second-order goods as
gracefully provided opportunities for such actions. In short, the view that all
passive evils can be justified by the second-order goods eventually springing from
them reflects a one-sided and unwarranted optimism, as well as a rather perverse
account of responsible and virtuous human action.
Briefly, it seems that the personal life defence is deficient in more than one
respect.
IV
14. For a somewhat different way of criticizing the "need for knowledge argument," see
David O'Connor, "Swinburne on Natural Evil," Religious Studies 19 (1983), p.65-
73; idem, "Swinburne on Natural Evil from Natural Processes", International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1991), p.77-88.
15. D.Z. Phillips, "The Problem of Evil," in: Brown, Reason and Religion, p.l 13.
16. W.S. Anglin, Free Will and the Christian Faith, Oxford 1990, p. 153.
17. See on these V. Brummer, What Are We Doing When We Pray?, London 1984,
chapter 4.2.
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Instead of pursuing any or each of the indicated lines of criticism now, however,
I want to draw attention to another difficulty, which is evoked by the personal
life defence as a whole, rather than by one particular strand of it. This is what I
call the argument from eschatology. It belongs to the constitutive characteristics
of Christian faith to pray for the coming of the Kingdom of God, and to believe
that once this prayer will be heard. This implies, that God is expected by the
believer to gain the ultimate victory over evil, so that all evils in our world will
have to give way, and the present order of things will radically be changed.
Praying for the coming of the Kingdom means among other things17 praying
that as a result of the restored relationship with God a completely new or
renewed order of things may be instituted. To indicate the nature of this new
dispensation, the Bible uses the image of a new Jerusalem, in which God "will
wipe every tear from their eyes, and there shall be an end to death, and to
mourning and crying and pain: for the old order has passed away!" (Rev.21,4).
Now clearly, if we take the personal life defence seriously, this Kingdom
of God cannot possibly be something to be longed for. According to all of the
arguments discussed above, a universe without pain and sorrows would be a
worse rather than a better universe in comparison to the present one. No regular
ecology would be possible, nor a stable natural order which we could rely upon.
The possibilities of personal growth and life-fulfilment, intellectual creativity,
cultural development, scientific progress etc. would be excluded. There would be
no room for the acquisition of virtues like courage, unselfishness, sympathy etc.
In short, all arguments used by Brummer and others to explain and justify the
existence of passive evil in a theistic universe turn out to be at the same time
arguments against the desirability of a new Jerusalem. For surely it is perverse
to long for an eschaton which exemplifies a worse over-all state of affairs in
comparison to the present order. And from the perspective of the personal life
defence, the Kingdom of God as portrayed in, for example, Rev.21,4 is just that.
In response, we could of course decide to jettison traditional accounts of a
future eschaton, as well as any hope for an essentially better world. We could for
example simply dismiss the idea of a glorified life after death as a superfluous
additional hypothesis, which is detrimental to the project of saving theism, since
it unnecessarily complicates things. This is the tack Swinburne seems to take."
We could also follow a religiously more viable line and adopt some form of
"realized eschatology," in conceiving of the Kingdom of God as already
actualized and present among us in the Spirit, i.e. in the restored relationship with
God which is experienced in the community of believers. Following this line of
thinking, which is suggested by Grace Jantzen,19 we may hope that more and
more people will be attracted to participate in this community's commitment to
self-sacrificing love and dedication. But even so, we should be conscious of the
fact that it is a fairly high price to pay if we altogether reject the expectation of
a structurally different "life of the world to come" (Nicene Creed).
For example, we could not console ourselves and others with the hope that
some day diseases, suffering and death, as well as the threat of things like torture
18. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford 1979, p.221f.
19. O.M. Jantzen, "Do We Need Immortality?," Modern Theology 1 (1984), p,33-44.
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and starvation will have ended. Nor can we hope for a situation in which the
unjustified sufferings of many people become outweighed (which is, by the way,
not the same as compensated or justified) by God's glory. The reason for this is
not that such consolation would be fallacious since it lacks any evidential basis,
but that it would be entirely ill-conceived. !n fact, natural evil cannot be regarded
as evii in a strict sense20, since it is wrong to hope for its abrogation. To say
that a thing or event is evil amounts to, among other things, claiming that it
shouldn't exist or take place. But according to the personal life defence it is a
good thing that sickness, suffering, death etc. do exist, since that is the only way
for human beings to live as morally responsible persons (to repeat only this
argument). Spelled out in this way, the personal life defence turns out to have a
strong Leibnizian flavour: the actual world is the best possible one.
Even if we would argue that the personal life defence does not necessarily
preclude belief in an eternal life after death, it would be highly difficult to point
out what sense we could make of such a belief. For surely eternal life could not
be significantly different from our present life. If it were conducted within
another physical order, this could only be one which (all things considered)
would be worse. At best, the new Jerusalem could be imagined as the perpetual
continuation of the actual sublunary world with all its ambiguities and
vulnerabilities - but it is of course questionable whether we should long for and
believe in that sort of after-world. However this may be, "a new heaven and a
new earth," i.e. a new universe could never fulfil the authentic Christian hope that
"what we suffer at the present time cannot be compared at all with the glory that
is going to be revealed to us" (Rom.8,18). On the contrary, both situations would
be identical in all their relevant aspects. We should not long for a world in which
the preconditions for the experience of evil have disappeared. The old heaven and
earth are the best we can conceive of.
1 conclude that as a result of these implications of the argument from
eschatology, the personal life defence is not only incompatible with the kind of
world we could reasonably expect an omnipotent and perfectly good God to
20. Cf. A. Vos, "The Problem of Evil: Wrong Question?," in: A. Sanders et al. (eds.),
Belief in God and Intellectual Honesty. Essays in Honor ofH.G. Hubbeling, Assen
1990, p.123-141, especially p.135-137. "Creation is good. There is not only an
ontological gulf between Creator and creatures, bul there is also a relative
independence in virtue of which the physical system acts as the background of
moral activity, as the 'ground' of moral being. In this context there would be much
to say about pain, disease, accidents and disaster. But my main point is here that
talk about 'evil' is misleading" (p. 135).
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create (as appeared from its other deficiencies pointed out above), but also
religiously inadequate, while conflicting with any viable form of eschatology.
Thus far, our argument has been rather critical of the work of Prof. Brummer.
Remarkably, however, it is Brummer himself who stirred up this criticism in a
later article of his.21 Here, Briimmer puts forward many of the forementioned
arguments against the personal life defence, including the argument from
eschatology! Instead of aligning himself with Swinburne's theodicy for natural
evil, Brummer now parts company with him in arguing that human freedom and
responsibility have no intrinsic value which could justify natural evil.22 Even if
we replace these concepts by that of human flourishing, which according to
Brummer does have such an intrinsic value, Swinburne's line of argument
continues to be "both misconceived and inadequate"23 for various reasons, all
of which correspond to particular aspects of our own forementioned critique of
the personal life defence.
Briimmer's criticism culminates in the accusation of moral insensidvity, but
one of the difficulties (according to Brummer even an "more serious"24 one) he
mentions in passing has to do with what we called the argument from
eschatology. In this connection, Briimmer defends the possibility of an
eschatological situation for which we might long by arguing as follows: "The
specific form which human flourishing is to take and the specific sorts of action
which are to count as virtuous, depend on the sort of world in which we are
living." As to the new Jerusalem, "flourishing in that sort of world cannot take
on the same form as in this world,"25 which does not mean that flourishing
cannot take on any form at all here. Rather, Brummer suggests that human
flourishing in the new Jerusalem will take place without the continual threat of
natural evil. This suggestion, however, robs the personal life defence of its most
crucial cornerstone. For if human flourishing is also possible in the absence of
21. V. Brummer, "Moral Sensitivity and the Free Will Defence," Neue Zeitschrift für
systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 29 (1987), p.86-100.
22. Ibid., p.88, 90.
23. Ibid., p.90.
24. Ibid.
25. Both quotations ibid., p.91.
natural evil, then it is incoherent to argue at the same time that natural evil is a
necessary condition for the possibility of human flourishing and personal life.
In short, in 1987 it seemed that Brummer had become much more sensitive
to the force of arguments against the personal life defence. Although he did not
discuss the question of natural evil separately in his 1987 article, one was almost
forced to assume that Brummer had yielded his former position with regard to it.
This assumption became falsified, however, when in 1989 Briimmer reiterated his
personal life defence in virtually the same form as in 1982.26 Since then, we are
at a loss as to how Briimmer really conceives of the relation between theodicy
and eschatology. Only one explanation seems to be left: Brummer is inconsistent
in the views he takes with regard to this relation in different parts of his work.
This is the more remarkable, since in Briimmer's methodological view of the
nature of systematic theology the demand of consistency plays a central role.27
VI
Perhaps, however, we are too quick in drawing our conclusions. Perhaps,
Briimmer is not at all inconsistent, but only emphasizes different things in
different contexts, things which do not necessarily exclude each other when
connected up with each other in a proper way. The only way to sort out whether
this is the case, is to try to find a way out of the dilemma described above.
Before rejecting Briimmer's views on theodicy and eschatology as inconsistent,
we should at least do this.
The most promising approach towards a comprehensive and consistent
account of the personal life defence in combination with a religiousiy adequate
eschatology seems to me the following one. Besides the possibilities of a future
and a realized eschatology, there is the third option of a realizing eschatology. In
order !o imagine how life could become better than it is without the actual natural
order being overthrown, we should explore this notion. Let us suppose that in the
course of time people learn from their faults and become morally improved to
some degree, so that the total amount of moral evil diminishes. Let us further
imagine that in the end, as a result of their moral growth, all people are so
convinced of the absurdity of moral evil that they refrain from performing evil
26. V. Brummer, "Zijn theodicee-argumenten overtuigend?," p.67-71 (cf. above, n.5).
27. See, for example, Vincent Briimmer, "Metaphorical Thinking and Systematic
Theology," Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 43 (1989), p.213-228.
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at all. Passive evil will have been greatly reduced in this situation; only the part
of it which has nothing to do with human evil action will continue to exist.
It is possible, however, that people not only gradually mature in morality,
but also in prudence, carefulness and intelligence. Here also, they might learn
from their mistakes. Thus, they would more and more come to know how to
avoid being harmed by natural evil. The culmination of this development might
be that our increasing knowledge of bio-chemical brain processes enables us to
influence the processes of ageing and dying, so that it becomes possible to banish
death. If we extend this line of thought to other forms of natural evil, we can
imagine a kind of eschatological situation in which, although the possibility of
natural evil always remains, the number of actual occurrences of natural evil has
been reduced to zero. In short, to paraphrase the words of the Dutch poet
Camphuysen: If all men were wise, and also did weil, earth would be a paradise,
rather than a hell.
The most pertinent criticism of this scenario is of course that there is little
empirical evidence in support of it. The pervasive reality of sin and the persistent
power of evil are blatantly underestimated in it. Another version of basically the
same approach which is both empirically and theologically more satisfying in this
respect, however, is to be found in John Hick's soul-making theodicy. Here, it is
God who purposely creates human beings within a natural order which contains
a genuine risk of evil, of failure and suffering. The reason for this is that our
natura! order is the only "kind of world that God might make as an environment
in which moral beings may be fashioned, through their own free insights and
responses, into 'children of God'."28 In other words: it was logically impossible
for God to create human beings at once as spiritually and morally mature persons,
since spiritual and moral maturity can only be acquired through a process of
cumulative experience, in which the threats and the temptations of evil are
gradually overcome.
The assumption of such an on-going soul-making process seems to remove
our embarrassment with regard to Briimmer's view on the relation between
theodicy and eschatology, and to solve the suspected dilemma between both.29
28. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, London 21977, p.257. Although H. Berkhof,
Christelijk geloof, Nijkerk '1990, nowhere quotes Hick's book approvingly, there are
important similarities in Hick's and Berkhof's theological views on evil, as is
especially clear in their respective doctrines of creation and eschatologies.
29. Significantly, in his 1987 article Brummer explicitly refers to Hick's soul-making
theodicy as entailing a conceivable account of eschatology ("Moral Sensitivity,"
P-91).
On the one hand, the presence of natural evil is a logically necessary condition
for the making of real persons. Since it is generally acknowledged that
omnipotence does not entail the ability to do the logically impossible, even an
omnipotent God cannot by-pass the process of spiritual and moral growth, which
necessarily takes place in the interaction with real challenges. On the other hand,
this does not mean that a world containing natural evil is by definition a better
world than a world without natural evil. Nor does it entail that it is unreasonable
to long for the eschatological perfection and transformation of our earthly
existence. On the contrary, it is precisely the doctrine of eschatological
consummation which "provides the capstone for theodicy,"30 Only when the
spiritual and moral perfection of human beings will really be attained in the
eschaton, the existence of natural evil in our present world might be justified. In
this way, far from being its rival, eschatology functions as theodicy's necessary
complement.
Moreover, the soul-making theodicy cannot be as easily criticized for its
lack of empirical support as its more secular counterpart. For supposing that God
does not want to manipulate human beings in order to further their spiritual and
moral development, it may take an immense amount of time, far more than only
our earthly existence, before God's steadfast love will win the victory over evil
and our human "long and slow pilgrim's progress towards the Celestial City"31
will be completed. The Christian belief in an eternal life beyond death is of
crucial importance here.
In short, to interpret the relation between theodicy and eschatology in terms
of Hick's soul-making (or, we might say, person-making) theodicy seems to be
a constructive and successful proposal for making Briimmer's views on this
relation consistent and comprehensively coherent. Nevertheless, the flaw of this
proposal is not hard to find. For it does not deal seriously with the question of
what happens with the natural order in the eschatologica! situation. There are two
mutually exclusive possibilities here, which together reformulate our dilemma in
its full force.
1. Either the eschaton will show a natural order that is free from all the
ambiguities which now threaten us so persistently. In this case, there is neither
the risk of harming others or the environment, nor the risk of being harmed by
others or by the environment. But then we will not in any way live a truly
30. O. Stanley Kane, "Soul-making Theodicy and Eschatology," Sophia 14 (1975), p.27.
Cf. Hick, Evil, p.384,
31. Hick, Evil, p.386.
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personal life, in spiritual maturity and moral responsibility. It will even be unclear
why we had, in such a slow and painful process, to learn to live as such mature
persons at all.
2. Or the eschaton will display a natural order which is equally beset with
the risks of natural evil and suffering as ours. Perhaps the actual occurrences of
evil and suffering will greatly have been reduced, as a result of our perfected
prudential and moral capacities. But nonetheless animals will continue to devour
each other and plants. Or, if there is no animal and vegetable life, we are back
to the anthropocentric mono-culture, the rejection of which was part of the
personal life defence. Moreover, however intelligent and careful we may have
become, it will statistically remain unpreventable that people sometimes drown
in water, are burnt by fire, killed by unpredictable calamities etc.32
It will not help us to construct mediate forms between these two extremes,
for example by denying the eschatological existence of water, fire and
earthquakes. For to the extent that such mediate forms make the natural order less
unpredictable, they make human life less personal; and to the extent that they
make human life more fully personal, they make the natural order more
dangerous. Here we meet again with the mechanism which forms the very core
of the personal life defence. The more possibilities for evil disappear, the less we
are able to live and flourish as persons - or so the defence goes. Neither will it
help us to retreat to an appeal to ignorance or mystery at this point, as both Hick
and Brummer seem to do." For if argumentation and reasoned speculation is
permitted in the context of eschatology at all, than it is rather arbitrary to forbid
it precisely at this point. That would be too cheap a solution. In short, the most
promising way we could conceive of to reconcile the personal life theodicy with
an adequate account of eschatology fails.
32. Cf. Anglin, Free Will, p. 150: "Even if we always acted wisely and well, there would
still be a great number of natural evils."
33. John Hick responds to the objection that there is a fatal contradiction in his use of
eschatology to complete theodicy as follows: "This again is an exceedingly difficult
question to meet; nevertheless, I believe that its logical effect is rather to remind us
of our ignorance concerning the life of heaven..." (Evil, p.351). Brummer, as we saw
above, simply assumes that human flourishing will take on forms which do not
presuppose the existence of suffering and evil, without specifying how this might
be the case ("Moral Sensitivity," p.91).
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VII
We conclude with a fourfold remark.
First, the conceptual price-ticket of the adoption of the natural law theodicy
(and of the personal life defence as its most convincing elaboration) is the
abandonment of traditional eschatology, and vice versa. This dilemma attests to
the generally acknowledged need of a convincing and comprehensive theology
of nature.34
Second, faced with this dilemma there are two considerations which can
help us in choosing here. First of all, alternative lines of dealing theologically
with the problem of natural evil are available in the theistic tradition. For
example, in Judéo-Christian thought from Genesis 3 onwards natural evil has
been considered as the consequence of human sin and God's wrath over it.
Perhaps we should not reject the doctrine of original sin as easily as modem
theology usually does.35 But if we fear that the adoption of this traditional
answer wiîl only lead us into more difficulties, then there are other alternatives
which may be examined.36 In the second place, it is possible to live in faith
without having a clear-cut theodicy which answers all questions. In a certain
sense, this is precisely what living by faith amounts to: "Believing where we
cannot prove" (Tennyson). But it is far less meaningful to live in faith without
any eschatological hope, i.e. to believe in a God who will not ultimately succeed
in saving and liberating his people and his creation.
Third, it belongs to the ontological presuppositions (the "hard core") of the
biblical metaphors which portray the eschatological situation, that such a salvation
requires the overthrow of the present natural order. This is most clear from the
peaceful way in which animals live with each other according to these pictures.
Isaiah 11,6-9, for example, even if we take into account the metaphorical nature
of these verses, suggests a regular natural order without the possibility of natural
evil. There is one event which gives us hope that such a wonderful overthrow
might really take place: the Resurrection of Jesus, breaking the natural order of
death.
Fourth, we cannot escape the conclusion that Prof. Brummer is inconsistent
in some of his views on the relation between theodicy and eschatology. Perhaps,
34. See in this connection - to give only one recent example - Theo de Boer, De God
van de filosofen en de God van Pascal, Delft 1989, 37-42, 88-95.
35. For a useful recent defence of it, see Anglin, Free Will, p.149-151.
36. Anglin, Free Will, p.144-154 discusses five different accounts of natural evil.
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however, this is not as worrying as Brummer himself will think. For it is
precisely the (real or apparent) inconsistencies in the work of the master which
offer the pupil, standing on his shoulders, the opportunity to try to make some
further advance,37 Meanwhile, all our advances will perhaps turn out to signify
nothing in the light of the age which is to come, and which will no doubt be
totaliter aliter than we can now think of in our boldest imaginings. In that sense,
praying for the Kingdom to come and acting correspondingly is certainly of more
importance than speculating about its precise nature.
37. See for an example V. Brummer, "The Dilemma of a Christian Philosophy," in: R.
Kroner, A.E. Loen et al., Philosophy and Christianity. Philosophical Essays
Dedicated to Professor Dr. Herman Dooyeweerd, Kampen 1965, p. 166-177.
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